ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral (...) experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

If religion once seemed to have played out its role in the intellectual and political history of Western secular modernity, it has now returned with a vengeance. In this engaging study, Hent de Vries argues that a turn to religion discernible in recent philosophy anticipates and accompanies this development in the contemporary world. Though the book reaches back to Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and earlier, it takes its inspiration from the tradition of French phenomenology, notably Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, (...) and, especially, Jacques Derrida. Tracing how Derrida probes the discourse on religion, its metaphysical presuppositions, and its transformations, de Vries shows how this author consistently foregrounds the unexpected alliances between a radical interrogation of the history of Western philosophy and the religious inheritance from which that philosophy has increasingly sought to set itself apart. De Vries goes beyond formal analogies between the textual practices of deconstruction and so-called negative theology to address the necessity for a philosophical thinking that situates itself at once close to and at the farthest remove from traditional manifestations of the religious and the theological. This paradox is captured in the phrase adieu ( à dieu ), borrowed from Levinas, which signals at once a turn toward and a leave-taking from God -- and which also gestures toward and departs from the other of this divine other, the possibility of radical evil. Only by confronting such uncanny and difficult figures, de Vries claims, can one begin to think and act upon the ethical and political imperatives of our day. (shrink)

Unearthing the radical potential at the heart of canonical political thought, this book uses the work of Foucault and Deleuze to re-imagine theory in a way that embraces difference and resistance.

An account of the Rosicrucian manifestos, and in particular their call for a general reformation, in relation to medieval and early modern traditions and reform programs.

A cursory view of the history of ethical thinking shows the presence of a limited variety of 'styles of ethical reasoning', a term used in analogy of Crombie's 'styles of scientific reasoning' for systems of thought that set their own standards and techniques for providing evidence. Each style of reasoning tends to suggest a specific role for ethicists. Styles are appropriate relative to particular contexts of problems and require special institutions to flourish. Herman De Dijn's discussion in Taboes, monsters en (...) loterijen of the problems hybridsproduced in biomedicine and biotechnology pose for the symbolic order is shown to rest on two 'styles of ethical reasoning', viz, 'postulation of principles' and 'hermeneutics'. It is argued that both styles fall short, but for different reasons. 'Postulation of principles' is ill-equipped to answer problems posed by a world of change. Hermeneutics requires a pace of time and institutions not available in current society. Confronted with the problems De Dijn discusses, therefore two separate problems arise. Ethicistsnot only have to learn how to account for the hybrids that biomedicine and biotechnology produce, they also have to think about and contribute to institutional innovation. Rather than opening a space for discussing both tasks, De Dijn's styles of reasoning close off this matter. (shrink)

Over the past decade, many politicians and celebrities in North America have found themselves embroiled in scandals that involved them having worn black make-up and in at least one incident white make-up. In most of these cases, the used make-up was part of a costume for Halloween, Purim, Carnival, or a themed party. This article challenges the view that wearing cross-racial make-up on such occasions as part of personal costumes—as opposed to costumes that are integral to specific cultural traditions, such (...) as the New Orleans Zulu parade—is always wrong. To do so, it assesses the five most promising objections to this practice. Although some of these objections count against certain uses of cross-racial make-up, I show that in several high-profile cases where such make-up was worn, none of them had force, whether because the objections themselves were implausible and/or because they did not apply. (shrink)

It is not unusual for researchers to complain about institutional review board (IRB) oversight, but social scientists have a unique set of objections to the work of ethics committees. In an effort to better understand the problems associated with ethics review of social, behavioral, and economic sciences (SBES) research, this article examines 3 different aspects of research ethics committees: (a) the composition of review boards; (b) the guidelines used by these boards to review SBES - and in particular, behavioral health (...) - research; and (c) the actual deliberations of IRBs. The article concludes with recommendations for changes in the review process and with suggestions for filling the gaps in knowledge about the way IRBs work. (shrink)

Strong longtermism maintains that how we should act morally is determined almost entirely by the expected effects on the welfare of our descendants existing thousands if not millions of years into the future, who might include both other humans and any artificial agents with a comparable or higher moral status that we end up creating. It is based on three key assumptions: (i) that our descendants will have a moral status that is at least as high as ours and therefore (...) should not have their welfare discounted by us; (ii) that there is a good chance that these individuals will vastly outnumber us; and (iii) that we can do things here and now that can be expected to positively shape the long-term trajectory of humanity. The aim of this contribution is to suggest that authors such as Will MacAskill and Hilary Greaves have been too optimistic about all these assumptions as a result of having ignored evidence that the populations of postindustrial countries are becoming less intelligent due mostly to the negative relationship that has emerged within these societies between intelligence and fertility and to the proclivity of intelligent people to delay parenthood. (shrink)

Genetic engineering evokes a number of objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. The concept of animal integrity is often invoked to articulate these kind of objections. Moreover, in reaction to the advent of genetic engineering, the concept has been extended from the level of the individual animal to the level of the genome and of the species. However, the concept of animal integrity was not (...) developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the assumption that the concept of integrity, including its extensions to the level of the genome and the species, is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed at the genetic engineering of animals. (shrink)

Les thèses, proposées par M. Krämer, dans son ouvrage Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, marqueraient une révolution dans les études platoniciennes, si elles étaient acceptables. Selon lui, Platon a, dès le commencement de sa carrière philosophique, au moins dès l'ouverture de l'Académie, possédé un système élaboré d'ontologie. Ce système a été exposé aux membres de l'Académie, sous forme d'une doctrine ésotêrique. Les dialogues, qui sont entièrement des œuvres protreptiques, ne comportent que des allusions à cette doctrine; tout de même, sans (...) connaître ce fonds doctrinal, on ne peut vraiment comprendre les dialogues. Sans vouloir dresser un compte-rendu complet du livre en question, l'auteur du présent article voulait écrire quelques notes marginales. Ni le récit d'Aristoxène, ni les données plus tardives n'autorisent M. Kr. à déclarer que la fameuse conférence πεϱ τἀγαϑοῦ ait constitué une série de cours. En outre, le récit même n'est pas exempt d'invraisemblance, si l'on compare les fragments des poètes de la comédie moyenne. La dépréciation de l'œuvre écrite que contient la fin du Phèdre n'est pas absolue, comme le croît M. Krämer, mais relative. Dans la vue de M. Kr., il est difficile de comprendre pourquoi Platon a écrit. Surtout la composition des Lois est inexplicable. Dans la théorie d'un système ésotérique, l'héritage de Socrate ne reste plus reconnaissable. Si, comme dans les théories de M. Krämer, l'axiologie se confond avec l'ontologie, l'autonomie de la décision éthique disparaît, et la position priviligiée du Bien ne peut plus être comprise. Le refus de tout développement chez Platon contraint M. Krämer à donner des interprétations très forcées de plusieurs textes platoniciens. (shrink)

Maria Heim’s Voice of the Buddha: Buddhaghosa on the Immeasurable Words is a rare example of sustained scholarly engagement with commentarial literature. The book introduces the reader to the literary world of the Theravāda Buddhist exegete Buddhaghosa, with the stated goal of learning to read as he did. Heim shows with a series of close readings how Buddhaghosa read scripture with a high degree of attention to context, and how he understood both the Buddhist canon and the Buddha’s knowledge to (...) be infinitely expansive. Heim’s thorough and accessible treatment makes her presentation an approachable case study of commentarial literature. (shrink)

Love, sex, and physical intimacy are some of the most desired goods in life and they are increasingly being sought on dating apps such as Tinder, Bumble, and Badoo. For those who want a leg up in the chase for other people’s attention, almost all of these apps now offer the option of paying a fee to boost one’s visibility for a certain amount of time, which may range from 30 min to a few hours. In this article, I argue (...) that there are strong moral grounds and, in countries with laws against unconscionable contracts, legal ones for thinking that the sale of such visibility boosts should be regulated, if not banned altogether. To do so, I raise two objections against their unfettered sale, namely that it exploits the impaired autonomy of certain users and that it creates socio-economic injustices. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint? The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is fundamentally committed to the protection (...) of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met: Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations. The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children. To realise condition, which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible. My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to live in accordance with one’s conception of the good. (shrink)

Many individuals on the autism spectrum are hypersensitive to certain sensory stimuli. For this group, as well as for non-autistic individuals with sensory processing disorders, being exposed to e.g. fluorescent lights, perfume odours, and various sounds and noises can be real torment. In this article, I consider the normative implications of such offence for the design of office spaces, which is a topic that has not received any attention from philosophers. After identifying different ways in which the senses of hypersensitive (...) workers might be protected within these spaces, I show that many of such accommodations can be made at reasonable cost, before arguing that doing so ought to be a legal requirement. (shrink)

Teaching about technology, at all levels of education, can only be done properly when those who teach have a clear idea about what it is that they teach. In other words: they should be able to give a decent answer to the question: what is technology? In the philosophy of technology that question is explored. Therefore the philosophy of technology is a discipline with a high relevance for those who teach about technology. Literature in this field, though, is not always (...) easy to access for non-philosophers. This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of technology for such people. It offers a survey of the current state-of-affairs in the philosophy of technology, and also discusses the relevance of that for teaching about technology. The book can be used in introductory courses on the philosophy of technology in teacher education programs, engineering education programs, and by individual educators that are interested in the intriguing phenomenon of technology that is so important in our contemporary society. (shrink)

The use of genome-wide association studies in medical research and the increased ability to share data give a new twist to some of the perennial ethical issues associated with genomic research. GWAS create particular challenges because they produce fine, detailed, genotype information at high resolution, and the results of more focused studies can potentially be used to determine genetic variation for a wide range of conditions and traits. The information from a GWA scan is derived from DNA that is a (...) powerful personal identifier, and can provide information not just on the individual, but also on the individual's relatives, related groups, and populations. Furthermore, it creates large amounts of individual-specific digital information that is easy to share across international borders. This paper provides an overview of some of the key ethical issues around GWAS: consent, feedback of results, privacy, and the governance of research. Many of the questions that lie ahead of us in terms of the next generation sequencing methods will have been foreshadowed by GWAS and the debates around ethical and policy issues that these have created. (shrink)

Okay, Professor Turner is not Rodney King. He is not responding to bioethicists and social scientists running amuck, setting automobiles aflame, and pelting each other with rocks and broken bottles. He does not come right out and ask, “Why can't we all just get along?” But in its academic way, Turner's essay is an effort to negotiate a truce in the interdisciplinary squabbles that plague bioethics, a plea to move bioethics beyond the “misleading” and “unhelpful” “demarcation of disciplinary goals” that (...) leads to “dichotomous thinking” and “polemical accusations.”. (shrink)

The topic of epistemic injustice in global health ethics is complex, important and vast. While presenting as nuanced and complete a picture of the challenge as we possibly could, we were acutely aware of our positionality and how it gave us a certain viewpoint that would need to be expanded by others with different positions and experiences. We were, therefore, delighted to receive the collected commentaries by Atuire,1 Abimbola,2 Frimpong-Mansoh,3 Nyamnjoh and Ewuoso,4 Tangwa,5 Ambrogi et al.6 We would like to (...) thank these authors for furthering our account by raising questions, pointing out gaps or complementing our analysis. The points raised by these authors—and many points that will undoubtedly be raised by others in future—should be critically engaged with as we collectively define and work towards a more epistemically just global health ethics. Specifically, two points stand out. First, Frimpong-Mansoh accurately diagnoses our ambiguity about being drawn into debates about relativism in bioethics. We …. (shrink)

This article elaborates on Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, exploring the plausibility of his claim that each praxis has its own appropriate set of virtues. The exploration will be applied to what I term military praxis. Firstly, the article analyses what is meant by the concept of a praxis and how a military praxis can be defined, as well as the wider purpose of military praxis. From there it proceeds to the “internal goods”, the desires, to be realized in joining the (...) military. Which are these desires that are satisfied by participating in military praxis? Next, by combining the preceding steps, the article suggests which virtues are appropriate to the military praxis, focusing on seven virtues of military character: responsibility, competence, comradeship, respect, courage, resilience and discipline. This framework is completed by practical wisdom, the military virtue of intellect. I will conclude my article by elaborating on the role of narrative in integrating the virtues and by giving some concrete directions about ways in which education in the military virtues could take place. (shrink)

Faced with relatively old and ageing populations, a growing number of higher-income countries are struggling to provide affordable and decent care to their older citizens. This contribution proposes a new policy for dealing with this challenge. Under certain conditions, I argue that states should pay their citizens to move to foreign care homes in order to ease the pressure on domestic care institutions. This is the case if—but not necessarily only if— a significant proportion of resident citizens do not currently (...) have access to adequate aged and nursing care; the care in the foreign care homes is not worse than the one that is available in domestic care homes; sending states conduct regular checks to ascertain that the level of care abroad is not worse or delegate this task to reliable local monitoring bodies; appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that this type of migration does not harm local residents; and the public money spent on the payments is not better spent on other ways of easing the pressure on domestic care institutions. I end by defending the proposed payments against the objection that they create morally problematic inequalities by exerting greater pressure on members of lower socioeconomic classes to migrate than on their more affluent compatriots. (shrink)

We often speak of our own “best friends” and those of other people. But what does it mean for someone to be a best friend? While there is a large empirical literature studying the antecedents and consequences of best friendships and a small body of philosophical research on this topic, this question has not been addressed in detail. In this article, my aim is to fill this lacuna by distinguishing three different conceptions of best friends based on the semantic properties (...) of the term and the ways in which it is used in both academic discourse and ordinary parlance. They include those of a (i) comparatively best friend; (ii) comparatively best close/good friend; and (iii) institutional best friend. I conclude by drawing out the implications of this typology for empirical and philosophical work on best friendship and by identifying several avenues for future research. (shrink)